Abstract-Current International Criminal Law (ICL) suffers from at least four fairly serious theoretical shortcomings. First, as a starting point, the concept and meaning of ICL in its different variations must be clarified ('the concept and meaning issue'). Second, the question of whether and how punitive power can exist at the supranational level without a sovereign ('the ius puniendi issue') must be answered in a satisfactory manner. Third, the overall function or purpose of ICL as opposed to national criminal law ('the overall function issue') must be more convincingly explained. Fourth, the purposes of punishment in ICL, as opposed to the traditional purposes discussed in national criminal law, must be elaborated ('the purposes of punishment issue'). There is a partly vertical and partly horizontal relationship between these issues. It is, for example, of course impossible to reflect upon ius puniendi, overall function and purposes of punishment without having clarified the concept of ICL in the first place. Also, a treatment of overall function and purposes of punishment seems to be predicated on the justification of the ius puniendi. Indeed, the lack of a satisfactory answer to the ius puniendi issue is maybe the most important theoretical weakness of current ICL. This article therefore aims to demonstrate that a supranational ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient supranationality of the world order (understood normatively as an order of values) and the concept of a world society composed of world citizens whose law-the 'world citizen law' ('Weltbü rgerrecht')-is derived from universal, indivisible and interculturally recognized human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity. The incipient world order and the world society are represented by the international community (to be understood as a community of values) which becomes the holder of the ius puniendi.
Introduction: Noble Goals and High Expectations
The goals of International Criminal Law (ICL) are noble and the expectations high. The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Court's founding document, states that 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured'. It recognizes that 'such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world' and expresses determination 'to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.' 1 Thus, clearly, the mission of ICL and its first permanent World Court is a twofold one, consisting of an individualistic and a collective side: on an individual level, it aims to protect fundamental human rights by prosecuting and punishing international crimes violating these rights; on a collective level, it strives to contribute to the 'peace, security and well-being of the world' by the effective prosecution of international crimes threatening these values. Yet, just how difficult it is to accomplish this mission has become evident since the effective establishment of the Court in 2003. 2 It is not surprising then that some scholars warn of too high expectations, in particular with regard to the ICC's collective peace and security limb going beyond the classical function of a criminal tribunal, ie, to bring the responsible to book. 3 In addition, scholars have become increasingly aware of the theoretical shortcomings of the ICL project. 4 These shortcomings can be grouped around the issues described above in the abstract. I will focus here, after having clarified the 'concept and meaning issue', on the 'ius puniendi issue'. I will thereby prepare the ground for a later treatment of the 'overall function issue' in a separate paper. In that paper I will also deal, by way of a corollary, with the 'purposes of punishment issue'. 5 
The Concept and Meaning Issue
Georg Schwarzenberger identified in his seminal paper on ICL six meanings of the concept referring to different types of crimes of or under ICL. 6 His second, third and fourth groups, 7 all dealing with crimes implemented in domestic law pursuant to international treaties or generally recognized principles, 8 easily merge into one group which we would nowadays call 'treaty-based transnational' or 'international' crimes. We remain then with four meanings of ICL, summarized by Claus Kreß as follows: The first two groups are not of interest here for they concern the national law on the (extra)territorial scope of a State's domestic criminal law ('Strafanwendungsrecht') 10 and the mutual legal assistance between States in criminal matters. 11 The third group is only of indirect interest insofar as it is sometimes unclear where to draw the line between this group and 'true' or core international or supranational crimes. The recent terrorism decision of the Special Tribunal for the Lebanon is a case in point. 12 In any event, current ICL scholarship accepts the distinction between treaty-based or transnational crimes and supranational, 'true' international crimes. 13 Examples of the latter are the core crimes of articles 5-8 of the ICC Statute, 14 while treaty-based crimes are essentially transnational crimes, objects of the so-called suppression conventions 15 such as the UN Torture Convention, 16 the Terrorist Bombing Convention 17 or the UN Drugs Conventions.
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ICL stricto sensu ('Droit pénal international', 'Derecho penal internacional', 'Diritto penale internazionale', 'Völkerstrafrecht'), 19 which is of interest here, is, of course, not limited to the kind of crimes mentioned above. Rather, it comprises, to quote a well-accepted definition of Otto Triffterer, 'the totality of international law norms of a penal nature which conjoin typical legal consequences of criminal law with a decisive conduct -namely the international crime -and as such can be applied directly'. 20 If one accepts this 13 Kreß (n 9) paras 6-14 (transnational and supranational international criminal law stricto sensu); R Cryer and E Wilmshurst, 'Introduction' in R Cryer and others (eds) 14 See Ambos, (n 10) § 5, mn 3, § 7, mn 117; G Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press 2009) 29; Kreß (n 9) para 15; Cryer and Wilmshurst (n 13) 4; Gaeta (n 13) 66ff; A Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 12 extends this list to torture and 'some extreme forms of international terrorism'. R Kolb, Droit International Penal (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2008) 68-69, recognizes, in addition to the ICC core crimes, 'international crimes' because of their 'nature intrinsèque' distinguishing between public (state) and private (ordinary) crimes; yet, he does not provide criteria of delimitation of transnational crimes. 15 For an interesting analysis of the supposed first suppression treaty, the bilateral British/US anti-piracy Jay Treaty of 1794 and the later Submarine Cables Convention of 1884 see R Clark, 'Some Aspects of the Concept of ICL: Suppression Conventions, Jurisdiction, Submarine Cables and The Lotus ' (2011) 21 The idea of individual criminal responsibility and the ensuing prosecution of individuals for specific (macro-criminal) conduct 22 is derived from criminal law, while the classical (Nuremberg) offences 23 form part of (public) international law and thus the respective conduct is directly punishable under ICL (principle of direct individual criminal responsibility in public international law). 24 This strong grounding in criminal law, together with the actual enforcement of ICL by way of international criminal tribunals and the ICC, converts ICL into criminal law on a supranational level, fully encompassing the well-known principles of a liberal criminal justice system, in particular the principles of legality, culpability and fairness. 25 The institutionalization of ICL with the establishment of the ICC entails the creation of a single penal system of the international community 26 27 Following Andreas Paulus' distinction between international community and society: 'The term ''international community'' is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ''international society''. As a more extensive inquiry has shown, the usage is far from uniform. Nevertheless, one may say -with the necessary caution -that a community adds a normative element, a minimum of subjective cohesion to the social bond between its members. Whereas society emphasizes factual interconnections and interrelations, community looks core areas of substantive and procedural law towards other branches of criminal law (law of sanctions, enforcement of sentences, judicial assistance, etc). This new penal system, however, represents only one-the supranational-element of the new 'International Criminal Justice System' 28 which, in turn, may be conceived as an instrument of global (judicial) governance operating through legalization and formalization. Value-based Justification ICL lacks a consolidated (supranational) punitive power in its own right; it is, in the words of some recent critics, a 'penal system without a State' and thus 'without a sovereign'. 30 Does this mean that ICL also lacks the power and legitimacy to make use of criminal law to impose punishment on individuals, ie, does it lack a ius puniendi in its own right? The final answer is no, but we have to overcome some obstacles to get there.
A. ICL and the Normative Defence of the Incipient International Order
The international community today finds itself where the Nation-State stood when it came into existence: charged with the building-up and consolidation of a monopoly of power, ie, at the stage of an incipient State-like order at best. Of course, the Nation-States as the classical subjects of international law are called on to enforce not only their domestic but also international criminal law. 33 -although this does not automatically imply the creation of a new supranational sovereign power. 34 In addition, under the special legal regime of occupation the occupying power has the right to set up criminal tribunals as was done in Nuremberg, Tokyo or Iraq. 35 Yet, State delegation powers offer only a formal explanation of a supranational ius puniendi, they do not provide for normative reasons which would justify such a supranational authority in its own right.
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A normative approach must take on those theories for which the use of criminal law is predicated upon the existence of a State-like legal order, worthy of being defended by (supranational) criminal law in the first place. The argument has in our times been made with great force by the German legal theorist Gü nther Jakobs. 37 His argument goes like this: punishment is predicated on an existing normative order, ie, an order where norms are recognized by the society as a whole and determine the contents of social communication. 38 If such an order is absent or, as on the international level, only exists in an incipient stage, violent human acts are not directed against real norms, but are only the expression of brute force of a powerful individual or group of individuals against powerless victims. These may rise up against a despot, even kill him, but such reactions have nothing to do with punishment in the ordinary sense, even if meted out by an international criminal court. Speaking of punishment where the destruction of an existing (normative) order is not at issue, but such an order is, at best, still in the making, means ignoring the liberty of individuals, be it the perpetrators or the victims, who are not bound by any order in the first place. It confuses 'punishment in the State' with 'punishment in the natural state', 'criminal law' with 'mere punitive force', 'punishment through law' with 'punishment through force '. 39 Jakobs' line of argument is irrefutable if one is willing to share his fundamental premise, ie, that the existence of law and of any legal order is predicated on the existence of a State with the respective monopoly of power. This, of course, corresponds to the old Hobbesian view, according to which 'law' cannot exist without the State as the Leviathan which creates this law and makes sure that it is enforced and thus recognized as 'law' in the first place. 40 Kant has taken the same position predicating the existence of law on its enforceability by a public power which disposes of the necessary force. 41 In a way, also Kelsen followed these views in his Reine Rechtslehre, 42 but he nevertheless accepted-given the existence of an albeit incipient international order at his time, represented mainly by the League of Nations and later the United Nations (UN)-that (international) norms can be enforced by sanctions and that these may be imposed by other entities than States, for 38 42 H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Franz Deuticke 1960) 10: distinguishing between 'Geltung' (validity) and 'Wirksamkeit' ('efficacy') and arguing that a 'minimum' of the latter is the prerequisite of the former ('ein Minimum an sogenannter Wirksamkeit ist eine Bedingung ihrer Geltung') and 290: State as a social community constituted by a normative order which, as the 'one' order can only be the 'relatively centralized coercive order' recognized as the State legal order ('Wird der Staat als eine soziale Gemeinschaft begriffen, kann diese Gemeinschaft, . . . , nur durch eine normative Ordnung konstituiert sein. Da eine Gemeinschaft nur durch eine solche Ordnung konstituiert sein kann (ja, mit dieser Ordnung identisch ist), kann die den Staat konstituierende normative Ordnung nur die relativ zentralisierte Zwangsordnung sein, die wir als staatliche Rechtsordnung erkannt haben'; [emphasis in the original]). On Kelsen's concept of law, see R Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Karl Alber 1992) 139-41, 201-6 (arguing that norms that are complied with and enforced have a higher degree of validity than those that are not).
example within the system of collective security pursuant to chapter VII of the UN Charter. 43 Admittedly, sociological positivists like Jakobs may go beyond a State-centred approach in that they require social recognition of norms, 44 but these must always be backed up or at least complemented by State-like enforcement as an expression of real validity or efficacy. 45 In any case, these (State-centred) views, of course, entail the rejection of international law as (public) 'law'. 46 Further, ICL cannot exist-actually it is not law at allbecause there is no State-like international order to enforce it and thus to be defended in the first place. Indeed, for these reasons George Schwarzenberger did not recognize ICL stricto sensu as lex lata, but referred to it as 'lege ferenda' and called it a 'contradition in terms'. 47 However, notwithstanding the apparently compelling logical sequence of Jakobs' argument, it is not compelling enough. It does not get the whole picture since it fails to do justice to the international limb of ICL. And it takes too narrow a perspective on the fundamental issue of the validity of (international legal) norms. To begin with the latter: validity of norms may be predicated on their real, actual existence in a given society, but validity can also be linked to the material (normative or moral) foundation of their claim of being obligatory. In this sense one can distinguish between social and material validity or, what is the same for our purpose, (factual) validity and (material) legitimacy of norms. 48 In fact, the question of legitimacy plays a fairly 43 cf H Kelsen, 'Sanctions in International Law under the Charter of the United Nations' (1945/46) 31 Iowa L Rev 499, 500-2 (eg at 500: 'International law is law in the true sense of the term, for its rules, regulating the mutual behavior of states, provide sanctions to be directed against the state which has committed an international delict'). See also on the State 'as something different from the legal order' ('als ein von der Rechtsordnung verschiedenes Wesen') H Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht (Mohr 1922) 208. 44 Jakobs, 'Das Selbstverständnis der Strafrechtswissenschaft' (n 37) 58 (arguing that a norm is only effective if it determines social communication, ie, if it formulates socially accepted and stable expectations ('Eine Norm gilt, wenn sie den Inhalt mö glicher Kommunikation bestimmt, wenn also die an eine Person gerichtete Erwartung stabil ist'). For a similar approach see Hart (n 51). However, even Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (n 42) 11 (contrary to Jakobs' critique) acknowledges the importance of social recognition as he states that 'Wirksamkeit' does not only refer to the actual imposition and enforcement of a norm but also to compliance by the persons subject to it ('daß die Sanktion in einem konkreten Fall angeordnet und vollstreckt wird, sondern auch . . . , daß diese Norm von den der Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Subjekten befolgt . . . wird'). 45 See the quotes in n 37. important role in all theories of validity of norms, though the theories of (law as) force are the exception to the rule. 49 Indeed, even for (moderate) positivists like Kelsen, 50 Hart 51 or Alexy, 52 the positive (empirically existing) law ultimately operates with a legitimacy reservation, ie, it also requires a plausible claim of material (moral) validity. The famous Radbruch formula, starting from the validity of positive law in principle 53 but setting a limit to unbearable 'flawed law' ('unrichtiges Recht') by recourse to a principle of material justice ('Gerechtigkeit'), 54 is but another consequence of this legitimacy reservation. In international law, the power of legitimacy is recognized at least since Thomas Franck's seminal study on the subject. social processes 58 is particularly dependent on and, at the same time, advanced by the moral authority of norms, 59 ie their legitimacy. From this broader perspective Jakobs' approach can and in fact has been rightly criticized 60 for he puts 'validity' (in the sense of Geltung in a material-normative sense) and 'order' (Ordnung) on an equal footing 61 and thus ignores the potential force of norms as per their material, normative legitimacy, independent of an enforcement order in the form of a State or otherwise. In fact, such a concept of validity or existence of norms does not only negate the possibility of law at the international level, but also quite often at the domestic level, namely with regard to those States which do not possess a fully functioning monopoly of (State) power or where norms do not enjoy full social recognition. The criminal law of these States would then not even accord a normative value due to the absence of enforcement power.
As to ICL's international limb, the more fundamental question arises as to whether it makes sense at all to apply the theories of validity of norms, developed with the classical Nation-State in mind, to a supranational order which follows different rules of organization than a Nation-State. In any event, Jakobs and similar critics usually argue from a classical State-centred and national law perspective and are unconcerned with the complex subtleties of the emerging international order (which, of course, did not exist at the time of the Hobbesian and Kantian critique of the possibility of an international 'law') and the ensuing judicialization of international law. 62 Neither do they inquire into the role and competence of the UN Security Council in the UN's system of collective security, in particular with regard to the establishment of international criminal tribunals and the enforcement of their decisions and judgments, nor do they deal with the possibility of decentralized prosecutions by third states. Thus, they ignore, in a slightly thoughtless way, that there is already an existing, albeit incipient, supranational (legal) order 63 61 Jakobs, Norm, Person, Gesellschaft (n 37) 54. In a similar vein, see Jakobs, 'Strafrechtliche Zurechnung und die Bedingungen der Normgeltung' (n 38) 57, 58-59 on Kelsen's thesis of the 'Grundnorm'. 62 On this judicialization and an 'international constitutional judiciary' see T Broude, 'The Constitutional Function of Contemporary International Tribunals, or Kelsen's Visions Vindicated' (2012) 4 GoJIL 519, 528ff (discussing at 536ff by way of example the ICJ, the WTO dispute settlement system and ECtHR). 63 See eg O Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (2nd edn, Beck, 2002) 279 ('globaler Ultraminimalstaat'); Koskenniemi, 'Legal Cosmopolitanism' (n 55) 485 (emerging global community 'irresistibly under way'); J Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay (Suhrkamp 2011) 34 ('in Bruchstü cken institutionalisierte Weltordnung'). See also Merkel (n 46) 327 (recognizing, after his critique on the too 'rigid' Kantian concepts of 'Law' and 'Sovereignty', international law as 'unvollkommene . . . defizitäre, aber . . . doch Rechtsordnung').
one expression of the institutionalization or even constitutionalization of international law 64 where community interests prevail over unilateral or bilateral state interests. 65 In fact, it is not overly idealistic to claim that the different mechanisms of criminal accountability, existing both at the national and international level, have merged into the already mentioned international criminal justice system 66 which may be considered either the product of a certain normative criminal law order or in and of itself amount to such an order.
B. Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights by ICL
The argument that there is a normative international order, based on certain values worthy of being defended by ICL, can be traced back to the Kantian idea of human dignity as a source of fundamental human (civil) rights which, ultimately, must be enforced by a supra-or transnational (criminal) law.
68 For Immanuel Kant, dignity is opposed to value: everything which is replaceable 68 But note that for Kant such an (international) law was predicated on the existence of a public power to enforce it (n 41 and main text).
has relative worth or value, but that which cannot be replaced has intrinsic worth or dignity. Accordingly, anything which is a mere means to satisfy wants has value; and that which constitutes the condition under which anything can be an end in itself has dignity. Thus, dignity is intrinsic, deontological and non-negotiable (replaceable), it is the basis of the individuality and the mutual recognition (inter-personal relationship) of the members of a society. 69 Human dignity so understood is a self-sufficient, humanist concept which claims recognition and respect for and among human beings based on their status as persons with common peculiar characteristics (eg reason). 70 It accords any person a legal status for being human, independent and before the existence of community constituted as a State. It conceives of the State as a rational, instead of national, State whose authority is based exclusively on the rule of law.
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Kant's conception of human dignity is complemented by his vision of an 'eternal peace'.
72 To be 'eternal', ie, permanent and sustainable, such a peace presupposes the fulfilment of at least two conditions: most importantly, that the States have a republican constitution guaranteeing the liberty and equality of their citizens as 'inalienable rights'; 73 further, a world citizen law (Weltbürgerrecht) which entails the 'right of hospitality' (Recht der Hospitalität), 74 ie, that each citizen must not be treated in a hostile way by 69 Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) (n 41) 462 <www.korpora.org/Kant/aa06/462.html> accessed 24 January 2103. 'Die Menschheit selbst ist eine Wü rde; denn der Mensch kann von keinem Menschen (weder von Anderen noch sogar von sich selbst) blos als Mittel, sondern muß jederzeit zugleich als Zweck gebraucht werden, und darin besteht eben seine Würde (die Persönlichkeit), dadurch er sich ü ber alle andere Weltwesen, die nicht Menschen sind und doch gebraucht werden kö nnen, mithin ü ber alle Sachen erhebt. Gleichwie er also sich selbst fü r keinen Preis weggeben kann (welches der Pflicht der Selbstschätzung widerstreiten wü rde), so kann er auch nicht der eben so nothwendigen Selbstschätzung Anderer als Menschen entgegen handeln, d. i. er ist verbunden, die Wü rde der Menschheit an jedem anderen Menschen praktisch anzuerkennen, mithin ruht auf ihm eine Pflicht, die sich auf die jedem anderen Menschen nothwendig zu erzeigende Achtung bezieht.' (emphasis added); Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) in Gesammelte Schriften (n 41) vol IV (Reimer 1903) <www.korpora. org/Kant/aa04/428.html> accessed 24 January 2013. However, his previous race theory, distinguishing between a core or basic tribe ('Stammgattung', whites of brunette colour) and ordering four races in a hierarchical manner (the first being the highly blond of Northern Europe of wet cold areas and the last being the olive yellow Indians of dry heat areas), does not fit well in this conception (I Kant, Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen (1775) in Gesammelte Schriften another State. 75 From this, as rightly argued by Klaus Gü nther, 76 a two-step argument follows: first, a just and thus permanent peace is predicated on the recognition and respect for the rights of the citizens, ie, in modern language, human rights. Secondly, violations of these rights have to be stigmatized as serious wrongs and punished. Also, what is important in Kant's idea of a Weltbürgerrecht is the recognition of a (minimum) set of rights of each person, overcoming the individual's classical mediatization within the State order and in a world order between States. 77 In sum, with this conception, Kant laid the foundations for all current conceptions of human dignity and world peace. Indeed, the human dignity concept found its way into national legal instruments the 19 th century 78 and into international instruments in the 20 th century. 79 Thus, it was formally recognized as a legal concept and constitutes the basis and moral source of any subsequent codification of human (civil) rights. It serves as an interface between moral and positive law, preparing the ground for a transition from moral to (subjective) rights.
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Following Kant, a series of other, in particular German, scholars have argued that the State and the international community is called upon to protect the human dignity by way of criminal law. 81 According to Max Weber, human dignity is the origin of each criminal law system and a prerequisite to guarantee its functionality and ability to fight crime effectively. 82 Katrin Gierhake claims to encounter the foundations of ICL in Kant's legal doctrine of the autonomy of the free and reasonable subject. 83 She considers that international punishment compensates, on the individual level, for the material injustice brought about by an international crime with regard to the inter-personal relationship of citizens; on the general, universal level, supranational punishment operates as a restitution of the universal law and peace, equally violated by the international crime.
84 Thus, the international wrong has to be negated by way of (supranational) punishment. 85 In a similar vein, Reinhard Merkel 86 and Klaus Gü nther 87 demand stigmatization and punishment with a view to the confirmation and reinforcement of fundamental human rights norms. Last but not least, Frank Neubacher sees the legitimacy of international criminal tribunals in the gravity of the crimes to be prosecuted and thus the protection of universal legal interests.
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Other scholars employ a more cosmopolitan vision which can also be traced back to the Kantian idea of a Weltbürgerrecht, 89 and to his concept of human dignity, focusing on people instead of States as subjects of the international 'universal crime' consists in the 'negation of the constitutional and at the same time international legal capacity . . . of a collective entity (people) or state' ('Negation der Verfassungs-und zugleich Vö lkerrechtsfä-higkeit . . . eines Verbandes (Volkes) bzw. Staates' at 457 (author translation)). For Kö hler ICL (the 'universal crime') can only be justified if it affects the 'basic relationship as defined by public international law' ('Vö lkerrechtsverhältnis'), ie, if it negates the legal status or subjectivity of a collective entity (group, people, state), as for example by the crime of genocide and certain (universal) crimes against humanity. If the respective crime does not affect this 'Vö lkerrechtsverhältnis', eg in the case of non-international armed conflict crimes, ICL finds its limit in the-insofar as they exist-inalienable state sovereignty of this basic international law relationship (ibid, 454-63 95 Indeed, there is a unique mixture of a concrete consideration and an abstract claim which dismisses any general relativistic cultural challenge, 96 partly as a result of post-modern theories of legal pluralism.
The concrete consideration consists of the reference to concrete violations of fundamental human rights, translated into severe crimes against fundamental legal values of humanity and codified as international core crimes in articles 5-8 of the ICC Statute, which can hardly be approved of by any culture. 98 The abstract claim refers to the underlying moral position of the universal reach of these fundamental human rights and their punishment as international core crimes. 99 As a philosophical universalist position, it cannot be geographically restricted or culturally challenged since there is 'nothing about the way in which moral judgments are formed . . . which restricts the range of their appropriate application'. 100 Or, in other words, the validity of a moral claim is independent from its historic-geographical roots.
101 Indeed, nobody would seriously claim that Einstein's theory of relativity applies only in Switzerland since it was mainly the fruit of Einstein's Swiss years.
In line with this argument, Tü bingen philosopher Otfried Hö ffe has proposed a philosophical justification of an international criminal order based on human rights and justice as universally and interculturally recognized principles. In his view, the protection of human rights is the most important duty of the complementary world republic and this protection must ultimately be secured by a world criminal law. 102 This protection by criminal law is the flip side of the prohibition of conduct violating of human rights. 103 The legitimacy of this world criminal law can be guaranteed by limiting its application to the protection of the most basic human rights, to a kind of 'ethical minimum' (Minimalmoral). 104 Such a criminal law, grounded in human rights in normative terms and universally recognized by and adaptable to all cultures, is itself intercultural and thus may be applied across nations and cultures on a universal scale. 105 In a similar vein, Jü rgen Habermas defends a concept of human dignity which serves as a moral source of enforceable (subjective) human (civil) rights. 106 It is complemented by a theory of a cosmopolitan community with world citizens and States as legal subjects whose primary purpose is to safeguard world security and fundamental human rights as minima moralia. 107 On this basis he argues that the 'establishment of a world citizen State of affairs' entails that 'infringements of human rights . . . are to be prosecuted as criminal acts within a domestic legal order'. 108 Anglo-American theorists come to similar results, albeit focusing more strongly on international law considerations. Some start from a State's duty to protect basic human rights and thus punish offenders. Failing to do so, a State cannot legitimately object to (international) humanitarian intervention in the form of supranational prosecutions and punishment. It loses, from a sovereignty perspective, the legitimacy to invoke the (absolute) sovereignty defence. 109 In fact, this line of argument is based on the understanding of the international community as a community bound together by common values 110 and the existence of an international constitutional order rooted in the same values (constitutionalization thesis).
111 A value-based international community does not only stand for 'State values' but also for 'community values' of concern to humankind as such, eg universal peace and the protection of fundamental human rights. As to the latter there exists a minimum, 'overlapping' consensus 112 regarding the universal normative validity of fundamental human rights. 113 As a consequence, the international community, as the holder of the international ius puniendi, has a right to take criminal action against the perpetrators of international core crimes. 114 The existence of an international legal framework in the sense of a 'constitutional order', which protects certain common values, in particular fundamental human rights, entails, as just mentioned, a limitation of classical State sovereignty (in the sense of a genuine domaine resérvé) in that States can no longer claim this right if they fail to protect or even actively violate fundamental human rights. 115 In other words, the legitimacy of the exercise of State power is predicated on the respect for fundamental human rights. 116 Thus, in essence, the common values recognized by both the international community and the international constitutional order limit the sovereignty of Unrechtsstaaten (outlaw States). Such a combined rights and constitutionality approach is, for example, advanced by Altman and Wellman when they invoke a concept of functional sovereignty according to which 'states that do not sufficiently protect the basic rights of their people have no legitimate objection to the imposition of ICL on them'. 117 In a similar vein, for Allan Buchanan a State's legitimacy hinges on its ability and willingness to protect the human rights of its citizens; only then is the State delivering justice and can be considered as a rights-protecting institution. If it fails to do so, alternative (international) institutions must afford this protection. 118 The same idea is embodied in Larry May's security principle, according to which a State's sovereignty may legitimately be abridged if it fails to protect the security of some of its citizens by failing to prosecute other citizens for committing egregious rights violations. 119 Other Anglo-American authors focus rather on a human rights and human dignity approach stressing the-already mentioned-cosmopolitan vision of a world society composed of citizens as subjects in their own right with their own world citizen law. 120 Thus, for example, Mark Osiel argues that criminal prosecution of State-sponsored mass atrocities contributes to social solidarity 'embodied in the increasingly respectful way that citizens can come to acknowledge the differing views of their fellows'. 121 David Luban claims with regard to crimes against humanity that the assault on 'the core humanity that we all share and that distinguishes us from other human beings', 122 on 'the individuality and sociability of the victims in tandem', 123 converts the perpetrator into an enemy and a legitimate target of all humankind-a hostis humani generis. 124 Adil Ahmad Haque, in his 'retributivist theory of ICL', 125 brings the (State's) duty to protect 126 together with the group character of international crimes 127 and the human dignity of each individual worthy of protection. 128 For him the duty to punish rests on the 'relational structure of retributive justice', ie, the 'offender's violation of the victim's right gives rise to a duty of the punishing agent, owed to the victim, to punish the offender'. 129 Thus, the State's duty to punish is 'grounded in the relationship between the three actors': the perpetrator, the victim and the State as the intermediary.
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The State is premised on the effective discharge of its duty to punish-if it fails to do so international intervention is warranted.
131 Mark Drumbl wants to replace pure criminal law by a broader, albeit highly abstract, concept of justice: a 'cosmopolitan pluralist vision' fostering 'an obligation-based preventative model, operationalized from the bottom-up through diverse modalities that contemplate a coordinated admixture of sanctions calibrated to each specific atrocity'. 132 Kirsten Fisher, drawing in particular on May and Luban, proposes a double 'severity' and 'associative' threshold which has to be reached to justify the application of ICL. 133 The former requires that the most basic human rights protecting the physical security of human beings, being a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other rights, are jeopardized by the respective conduct, ie it relates to the gravity of the harm caused with a view to physical security. 134 The associative threshold represents the group or organizational element in international crimes in a double sense, ie, the political organization or group as the aggressor ('travesty of political organization') or as the object of the aggression with the victims belonging to this organization. 135 Ultimately, an approach based on the core human rights of world citizens makes us see that a universal legal order, ie, the order of the world society of world citizens, is possible by the force of the intrinsic value of its norms 136 'without a central legislator and a judiciary' (Luhmann) 137 and 'without the monopoly of power of a world State and without world government' (Habermas). 138 Thus, it links human dignity and rights with the idea of a normative international order. The above-mentioned international criminal justice system, if it does not amount in itself to a proper legal order, rests on this value-based order, its ius puniendi is derived from autonomous persons united in a world society: ubi societas ibi ius puniendi. 139 It represents a value judgment expressing the legal and moral necessity to punish macro criminal conduct. 140 Its law, the ICL, can be considered a progress of civilization 141 and, in this sense, an ethical project. 142 The international crimes to be prevented or punished by this law concern the fundamental international values of our international order and the world society; they may even amount to ius cogens crimes, ie crimes of a peremptory, non-derogable and overriding character. 143 As a consequence, a State on whose territory such crimes have been committed cannot hide behind the curtain of a post-Westphalian, Grotian sovereignty concept, 144 but must make sure that the responsible are held accountable; otherwise the international community or third States (universal jurisdiction) will have to take care of them.
Conclusion
A supranational ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient stages of supranationality of a valued-based world order and the concept of a world society composed of world citizens whose law-the 'world citizen law' (Weltbürgerrecht)-is derived from universal, indivisible and interculturally recognized human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity. In fact, this combination of the collective and the individual is implicit in the preamble of the ICC Statute referred to at the beginning of this article: on the one hand, it relates to the collective level-'international community', 'peace, security and well-being of the world'-and on the other hand to the individual level-crimes, perpetrators, victims. As to the collective level it has been argued here that international core crimes affect the international community as a whole and thus this value-based community has a right to take criminal action against the perpetrators of these crimes. 145 This community is the holder of the international ius puniendi. In a similar vein, according to the constitutionalization thesis, the justification of authority under international law, ie the legitimacy of the exercise of State power, is predicated on the respect for fundamental human rights. 146 As to the individual level, the starting point is a conception of international (criminal) law which focuses on the people and takes their rights seriously. 147 Taking human rights, and citizens as subjects of these rights, seriously shifts the focus from the collective (sovereign States) to the individual (citizens as subjects of rights) and derives the ius puniendi from the violations of universally, transnationally and interculturally recognized rights of individuals. 146 See nn 111, 115 and 116 and main text. 147 See n 90.
